Investments in managerial skills and bargaining over inputs

This paper analyzes the incentives of the members of a committee to acquire skills, when they will share a fixed budget among them in ex-post negotiations. Skills are interpreted as the ability to manage a collective budget, in the sense that shares assigned to skilled agents generate positive externalities to all members. In this setting, the equilibrium generally displays an over-qualified population.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Cardona, Daniel ; Rubí-Barceló, Antoni
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials
Subject:	Investments \| Hold-up \| Multilateral bargaining \| Skills \| Externalities

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DEA Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 54
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610797