Involuntary Unemployment and Non-compensating Wage Differentials in an Experimental Labour Market.
In this paper, the authors report the results of a series of efficiency wage experiments. Some of the key predictions of the efficiency wage hypothesis are qualitatively confirmed by the data: higher wages caused a reduction in shirking; firms offered contracts which exhibited positive job rents; firms offered systematically different wages and job rents which gave rise to noncompensating income differentials; and endogenous involuntary unemployment occurred. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Riedl, Arno |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 106.1996, 434, p. 106-21
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
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