Is conservatism demanded by performance measurement in compensation contracts? : evidence from earnings measures used in bonus formulas
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Na, Ke ; Zhang, Ivy Xiying ; Zhang, Yong |
Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-7136, ZDB-ID 2004326-0. - Vol. 29.2024, 1, p. 809-851
|
Subject: | Compensation contracting | Conditional conservatism | Performance measurement | Performance-Messung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Vertrag | Contract |
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