Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Itoh, H.
Institutions:	Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University
Subject:	INFORMATION \| HUMAN RESOURCES \| MANPOWER \| MORAL HAZARD

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; M12 - Personnel Management
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602948