Job security, stability, and production efficiency

We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still prevail, and even for a significantly broader class of production functions.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Fu, Hu ; Kleinberg, Robert D. ; Lavi, Ron ; Smorodinsky, Rann
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 12.2017, 1, p. 1-24
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Matching \| stability \| labor market \| job security \| efﬁciency

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE2016 [DOI] 896016854 [GVK] hdl:10419/197181 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:2016 [RePEc]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010061