La résolution des litiges blockchain - vers un arbitrage décentralisé ?

‘’Blockchain’’ is often described as a technology that allows the prevention of conflicts. The code is thus presumed to accurately execute the will of the parties. However, blockchain technology supports economic and social interactions between humans and, as in any social environment, disputes are inevitable.This Master Thesis presents a new type of disputes that has emerged from the blockchain ecosystem, particularly from the use of smart contracts and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). As with e-commerce disputes, blockchain disputes cannot be resolved by state courts, which are deemed too slow and expensive for litigants. Moreover, because of the pseudonymity and the decentralization of the network that both characterize blockchain technology, traditional connecting factors of private international law are inefficient in locating blockchain disputes within state borders.In order to resolve this kind of disputes, several ‘’blockchain dispute resolution” platforms have been created. These mechanisms work in a decentralized and pseudonymous way. The "arbitrators" who are entrusted with deciding the dispute are generally chosen randomly and they increase their chances of being selected the more they stake cryptocurrencies. The decision-making process is coordinated through game theory and economic incentives and the execution of the decision – which takes the form of a transfer of cryptocurrencies to the winning party (i.e. the party who obtains the majority of the arbitrators’ votes) – is ensured by a smart contract. The automatic execution of the decision leads to the creation of an autonomous justice system that is able to execute its own decisions, which is known as ''decentralized justice''.The author presents and analyzes the legal scope of some of these alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, more precisely online dispute resolution (ODR) mechanisms. If the execution of decisions rendered by this type of ODR is guaranteed on the blockchain ("on-chain execution"), it remains unclear if they can have judicial effects outside the blockchain ("off-chain execution"). Indeed, some decisions are not limited to a transfer of cryptocurrencies but order one of the parties to perform a transaction in the physical world (for example, to pay for damages in fiat currency). A party may thus take legal action before a state authority to obtain the recognition and enforcement of the decision. As arbitral awards that fall within the meaning of the 1958 New York Convention benefit from the same enforceability as foreign judgements, the author analyzes whether decisions rendered by ‘’blockchain dispute resolution’’ mechanisms can be qualified as arbitral awards, by focusing on the procedure set up by the Kleros platform. If this were the case, decisions rendered by Kleros – and possibly other blockchain dispute resolution mechanisms – could be enforced both on-chain and off-chain