Labor market issues for administrators: evidence from public schools in Texas

This dissertation examines three labor market issues regarding public schooladministrators in Texas using personnel records from the 1994-95 school year untilthe 2003-04 school year. The first essay explores promotion rates of men and womento school principal, a position that requires certification. I find ignoring gender differences in desire for promotion yields results similar to the existing literature: menhold an advantage in the promotion process. However, restricting the analysis to onlythose individuals who have expressed interest in an administrative position, those whobecame trained and certified as a principal, I find men and women face no statisticallysignificant difference in the probability of promotion. Duration analysis shows thatalthough men are most often promoted four years after they become certified andwomen are most often promoted six to seven years after becoming certified, womenface a much higher hazard of promotion than men. This cannot be explained by ahigher exit rate from the education sector by men.The second essay examines the effect of restrictive licensing on the quality ofthe entrants into a profession. Theory suggests that requiring minimum competencystandards truncates the low end of the quality distribution, however, increased costsof entry encourage talented potential entrants to pursue outside opportunities. Usingthe public school principal profession in Texas and measuring teacher quality by changes in student achievement, I find evidence that lower entry costs increase thequality of entrants. As a robustness check, I categorize observations geographicallyinto control and treatment groups to ensure the estimated effect is a result of reducedentry costs and not unobserved factors.The third essay examines the effect of increased school choice on the earningsand abilities of school administrators. I find an overall positive effect of competitionon administrators' earnings suggesting that productivity gains from hiring talentedmanagers outweigh the pressure to reduce costs by cutting salaries. However, theresults are sensitive to the level of competition, the type of labor market, and theadministrators' position. I control for possible endogeneity both mechanically andwith outside instruments and my conclusions are largely unchanged.