Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

Demichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Heller, Yuval
Published in:	American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 104.2014, 6, p. 1857-63
Publisher:	American Economic Association - AEA

More details

Extent:	application/pdf application/zip
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777179