Large shareholder portfolios, monitoring and legal protection of shareholders : A note

We consider an optimal portfolio diversification model in which a large shareholder can influence shares return by monitoring efficiently managers. Less diversification decreases insurance but increases the stake in the ownership and then enhances efficiency of management monitoring. We analyze the effect of legal shareholders protection on portfolio diversification.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	At, Christian ; Flochel, Laurent
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	corporate governance \| large shareholders \| optimal portfolio choice

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Post-Print.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00179976/en/
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791936