Layoff costs and efficiency with asymmetric information

Alain Delacroix; Etienne Wasmer

Wage determination under asymmetric information generates inefficiencies due to excess turnover. Severance pay and layoff taxes can improve efficiency. We show that inefficient separations can even be fully removed with fixed separation taxes in the case where the relevant private information is exponentially distributed. -- Bargaining ; asymmetric information ; employment protection legislation ; inefficient job separations

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Delacroix, Alain ; Wasmer, Etienne
Publisher:	Bonn : IZA
Subject:	Tarifverhandlungen \| Collective bargaining \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Arbeitsmobilität \| Labour mobility \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Arbeitnehmerschutz \| Employment protection \| Abfindung \| Redundancy pay \| Kündigungsschutz \| Dismissal protection \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (10 S.)
Series:	Discussion paper series / IZA. - Bonn : IZA, ZDB-ID 2120053-1. - Vol. 4524
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/36048 [Handle]
Classification:	J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J60 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003906313