Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels, but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if subjects do not know the distribution of endowments. Granting the leaders exclusion power does not lead to significantly higher contributions.
Year of publication: |
2005-07-01
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Authors: | Levati, Maria Vittoria ; Sutter, Matthias ; Heijden, Eline van der |
Institutions: | Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung für Strategische Interaktion |
Subject: | Experiment | Experiments | Führung | leadership | Öffentliches Gut | Public Property | Spieltheorie | game theory | Unscharfe Information | incomplete information |
Saved in:
Extent: | 281600 bytes 33 p. application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H41 - Public Goods ; Strategic management ; Market research ; Study of commerce ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866855
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