Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

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Year of publication:	2009-03
Authors:	Glöckner, Andreas ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Kube, Sebastian ; Nicklisch, Andreas ; Normann, Hans-Theo
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Subject:	Experiments \| Leadership \| Reciprocity \| Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2009_08
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612391