Learning-by-Doing; Consequences for Incentive Design.

Through a learning-by-doing process, a firm's efficiency depends positively on the extent of its previous business activity. From a dynamic incentives perspective, therefore, efficiency is endogenous. In addition, the efficiency of the firm is likely to be subject to private information. The model captures some of the trade-offs principals face in designing incentive schemes in this context.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Osmundsen, P.
Institutions:	Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH)
Subject:	INCENTIVES \| CONTRACTS \| INFORMATION

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Series:	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005781250