Learning Equilibrium Play: a Myopic Approach.

We model repeated play of noncooperative stage games in terms of approximate gradient steps. That simple format require little information and no optimization. Moreover, it allows players to evaluate marginal cost or profit inexactly and to move with different velocities. Uncertainty can also be accomodated. Granted some crucial stability, we show that play converges to Nash equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Flam, S.D.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	16 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647132