Learning, Quantal Response Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Beliefs

This paper makes two points. First, the modeling used in the rational (or Bayesian) learning literature can be generalized to handle the repeated shocks to preferences inherent and implicit in models of quantal response equilibria (QRE). In particular, we note that the Bayesian model and the QRE model are really not as different as often portrayed in the literature. Second, Bayesian learning under appropriate conditions therefore leads to a QRE.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Nyarko, Y.
Institutions:	C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of Economics
Subject:	QUANTAL RESPONSE EQUILIBRIUM \| BAYESIAN LEARNING \| GAME THEORY

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	19 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611707