Leniency programs and the design of antitrust : experimental evidence with free-form communication
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dijkstra, Peter T. ; Haan, Marco ; Schoonbeek, Lambert |
Published in: |
Review of industrial organization. - New York, NY : Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, ISSN 1573-7160, ZDB-ID 1478923-1. - Vol. 59.2021, 1, p. 13-36
|
Subject: | Antitrust | Cartels | Experiment | Leniency program | Kartell | Cartel | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Straffreiheit | Exemption from punishment | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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