Liability, Competition and Environmental Risk: Identical Agents, Different Behaviors.

In this paper we show that a strict liability fine, established on the marginal damages caused by production act as a mean to discriminate between firms. More precisely, facing a potential risk, understood as a random negative externality, "ex ante" identical rival firms playing on a competitive market may choose different risky and costly technologies.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Mondello, G. ; Soubeyran, A.
Institutions:	Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE)
Subject:	UNCERTAINTY \| TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE \| ENVIRONMENT \| LIABILITY

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Series:	G.R.E.Q.A.M..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	20 pages
Classification:	K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669429