Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fan, Cuihong ; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 1, p. 215-244
|
Subject: | Patents | Licensing | Auctions | Innovation | Mechanism design | Lizenz | Licence | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Patent | Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz | Industrial property rights | Auktion | Auction |
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