Licensing with capacity constraint

We consider a patent licensing game with a capacity constrained innovator. We show that when the constraint is strong (weak), the patentee prefers licensing by means of a fixed fee (unit royalty). In the case of a two-part tariff, the innovator charges a positive fixed fee if and only if the constraint is strong enough.

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Year of publication:	2020-08-28
Authors:	Colombo, Stefano ; Filippini, Luigi ; Sen, Debapriya

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Colombo, Stefano and Filippini, Luigi and Sen, Debapriya (2020): Licensing with capacity constraint.
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
Source:	BASE

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