Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in n-Person Games

In this paper, we study the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a "random" n-person non-cooperative game in which all players have a countable number of strategies. We provide explicit expressions for the expected number of pure strategy Nash Equilibria, and show that the distribution of the number of pure strategy Nash Equilibria approaches the Poisson distribution with mean 1 as the numbers of strategies of two or more players go to infinity.

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Year of publication:	1986-08
Authors:	Powers, Imelda Yeung
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Pure strategy \| Nash equilibria \| random n-person game \| strictly and weakly ordinal game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1990), 19(3): 277-286 The price is None Number 799 43 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249182