Linkage principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions

We compare the seller’s expected revenue in a second price sealed bid auction for a single object in which bidders receive multidimensional signals. Bidders’ valuations for the object depend on their signals and a signal observed privately by the seller. We show in various examples that the seller can be better off not revealing publicly his signal. Hence the linkage principle does not necessarily hold when bidders receive multidimensional signals.

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Year of publication:	2003-08-01
Authors:	Thierry, FOUCAULT ; Stefano, LOVO
Institutions:	HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Subject:	Auction Theory \| Linkage Principle \| Multidimensional Signals \| Blind Auctions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Les Cahiers de Recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Les Cahiers de Recherche - Groupe HEC Number 785 10 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011678