Lobbying with Conflicting Interests : Norwegian Local-Central Relations

The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway. A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobby model gain support in the data. The probability of obtaining substantial discretionary funding from the central level increases: with decreasing conflict of interest between local and central politicians; and with the lobbying cost incurred by local politicians. For a given cost, however, the rate of lobbying success depends crucially on structural characteristivs of the municipality. In particular, the successrate is significantly higher for poor municipalities located in national electoral districst with many seats pe voter than for rich municipalities located in districts with few seats per voter