Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Yap, Yee Jiun ; Luckraz, Shravan ; Tey, Siew Kian
Published in:	Economic Modelling. - Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993. - Vol. 39.2014, C, p. 8-18
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Research and development incentive \| Dynamic game \| Cournot duopoly \| Public good

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781989