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Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly

This article develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply contrasts to a static outcome. It is discussed that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies plays a decisive role in this finding.
Year of publication:
2011
Authors: Fujiwara, Kenji
Published in:
Resource and Energy Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0928-7655. - Vol. 33.2011, 1, p. 1-11
Publisher: Elsevier
Keywords: Differential game Asymmetric oligopoly Feedback strategy
Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008861496
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