Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market

In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided.

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Year of publication:	2011-03
Authors:	Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo ; Moreira, Helmar Nunes

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo and Moreira, Helmar Nunes (2011): Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market.
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; J23 - Employment Determination; Job Creation; Demand for Labor; Self-Employment
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015230788