Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market

Ricardo Azevedo Araujo, Helmar Nunes Moreira

In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium in the game theory evolutionary set up. A complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labour market is provided.

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Year of publication:	January-April 2014
Authors:	Araújo, Ricardo Azevedo ; Moreira, Helmar Nunes
Published in:	Economia : revista da ANPEC. - Bingley, United Kingdom : Emerald, ISSN 2358-2820, ZDB-ID 2451788-4. - Vol. 15.2014, 1, p. 41-53
Subject:	Evolutionary game theory approach \| Labour market \| Informal economy \| Lyapunov function \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory \| Arbeitsmarkttheorie \| Labour market theory \| Evolutionsökonomik \| Evolutionary economics

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Notes:	Zusammenfassung in spanischer Sprache
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.econ.2014.03.006 [DOI] hdl:10419/179562 [Handle]
Classification:	E26 - Informal Economy; Underground Economy ; J62 - Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865135