Extent: | Online-Ressource (614 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Description based upon print version of record Cover; Contents; Foreword; Acknowledgments; Contributors; Introduction; I. FINANCIAL BOOM-BUST CYCLES; Chapter 1 Lending Booms and Lending Standards; 1.1. Introduction; 1.2. Model; 1.3. Equilibrium; 1.4. Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Crises; 1.5. Determinants of Equilibrium; 1.6. The Role of Information Sharing; 1.7. Conclusion; Appendix I. Proofs; Appendix II. An Alternative Model of Information Acquisition; References; Chapter 2 Are Weak Banks Leading Credit Booms? Evidence from Emerging Europe; 2.1. Introduction; 2.2. Modeling How Bank Soundness Affects Credit Growth; Tables Table 2.1 Sample CoverageTable 2.2 Summary Statistics by Period and Region; 2.3. Are Weak Banks Driving Credit Expansions?; Table 2.3 Simultaneous Modeling of Bank Credit Growth and Distance to Default; Table 2.4 Credit Growth in the Weakest Banks; Table 2.5 Differences in Bank Credit Growth in the Baltics and Other CEECs; 2.4. Conclusion; Table 2.6 Differences in Credit Growth in Banks with High Exposures to Foreign-Currency Lending and Household Lending; Appendix I. Data Sources and Methodology; Table 2.7 Summary Statistics; Table 2.8 Summary Statistics by Country Table 2.9 Variable DescriptionReferences; Chapter 3 Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery; 3.1. Introduction; FIGURES; Figure 3.1 (A) Asian crisis. (B) Debt crisis; Figure 3.2 Protracted civil wars; 3.2. Methodology; 3.3. Data; 3.4. Results; Figure 3.3 Impulse responses: Currency crises; Figure 3.4 Impulse responses: Banking crises; Figure 3.5 Impulse responses: Twin financial crises (currency and banking); Figure 3.6 Impulse responses: Civil wars; Figure 3.7 Impulse responses: Stronger executive power Figure 3.8 Impulse responses: Twin political crises (war and stronger executive power)Table 3.1 Probability of Shocks; Figure 3.9 Impulse responses: Financial crises using Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) dates; Figure 3.10 Impulse responses: Penn World Tables dataset; Figure 3.11 Controlling for oil price changes; 3.5. Exogeneity; Figure 3.12 Impulse responses: Controlling for common period shocks; Figure 3.13 Forecast errors; Table 3.2 Consensus Forecast Errors for Growth; Figure 3.14 Impulse responses: Lagged response of output to crises Table 3.3 Probit Results for Financial and Political Crises3.6. Conclusion; References; Chapter 4 From Subprime Loans to Subprime Growth? Evidence for the Euro Area; 4.1. Introduction; Figure 4.1 Euro area: Money market and retail lending rates; Figure 4.2 Euro area: Changes in credit standards to enterprises and households, 2005-08; Figure 4.3 Euro area: Corporate and equity market prices, 2007-08; Figure 4.4 Euro area: Growth in bank loans and securities issuance, 2003-08; 4.2. Empirical Evidence; Table 4.1 Demand and Supply in the Disequilibrium Model, 1997-2007 Figure 4.5 Euro area: Distance to default for banks, 1991-2008 |
ISBN: | 978-1-58906-939-8 ; 978-1-4527-8907-1 ; 978-1-58906-939-8 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012677527