Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Celentani, Marco ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David K. ; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 64.1996, 3, p. 691-704
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Reputation | Theorie | Theory |
-
Reputation und Kooperation in einer Währungsunion
Stahn, Kerstin, (2000)
-
Beiträge zur Verhandlungstheorie
Berg, Christoph, (1999)
-
Formation de la réputation : quelques apports sur le rôle de l'inertie
Umbhauer, Gisèle, (2000)
- More ...
-
Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent
Celentani, Marco, (1995)
-
When are non-anonymous players negligible?
Fudenberg, Drew, (1995)
-
When are nonanonymous players negligible?
Fudenberg, Drew, (1998)
- More ...