Manager delegation, owner coordination and firms' investment in automation
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Stadler, Manfred ; Unsorg, Maximiliane |
Published in: |
Review of economics. - Berlin : de Gruyter Oldenbourg, ISSN 2366-035X, ZDB-ID 2178720-7. - Vol. 73.2022, 2, p. 159-182
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Subject: | common ownership | cost-reducing investment | manager compensation | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Automatisierung | Automation | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Investition | Investment | Investmentfonds | Investment Fund | Managervergütung | Executive compensation |
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