Managerial biases and debt contract design : the case of syndicated loans
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Adam, Tim ; Burg, Valentin ; Scheinert, Tobias ; Streitz, Daniel |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 66.2020, 1, p. 352-375
|
Subject: | behavioral biases | overconfidence | performance-sensitive debt | debt contracting | syndicated loans | Kredit | Credit | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Vertrag | Contract |
-
Managerial optimism and debt contract design : the case of syndicated loans
Adam, Tim R., (2014)
-
Customer concentration, relationship, and debt contracting
Yang, Ziyun, (2017)
-
Borrower private information covenants and loan contract monitoring
Carrizosa, Richard, (2017)
- More ...
-
Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design : The Case of Syndicated Loans
Adam, Tim, (2018)
-
Managerial Optimism and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans
Adam, Tim R., (2014)
-
Managerial Optimism and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans
Adam, Tim R., (2014)
- More ...