Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor

We examine firms' decisions to hire managers in a duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. In contrast with the case in which the public firm competes with a domestic private firm -where only the private firm decides to hire a manager- we find that both firms hire managers. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one obtained when neither firm hires a manager.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Fernández-Ruiz, Jorge
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 29.2009, 1, p. 90-99
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Mixed oligopoly

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562995