Managerial incentives and R&D investments : the moderating effect of the directors' and officers' liability insurance
Year of publication: |
January 2017
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Authors: | Chen, Li-Yueh ; Chen, Yu-Fen ; Yang, Sheng-Yung |
Published in: |
The North American journal of economics and finance : a journal of financial economics studies. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9408, ZDB-ID 1289278-6. - Vol. 39.2017, p. 210-222
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Subject: | Managerial incentive | CEO compensation | R&D investment | Directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance | Haftpflichtversicherung | Liability insurance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory | Kanada | Canada | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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