Managerial incentives, myopic loss aversion, and firm risk : a comparison of family and non-family firms
Year of publication: |
October 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Alessandri, Todd M. ; Mammen, Jan ; Eddleston, Kimberly |
Published in: |
Journal of business research : JBR. - New York, NY : Elsevier, ISSN 0148-2963, ZDB-ID 189773-1. - Vol. 91.2018, p. 19-27
|
Subject: | Family firms | Managerial incentives | Myopic loss aversion | Risk preferences | Organizational downside risk | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
-
Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts : experimental evidence
Lefebvre, Mathieu, (2014)
-
Seo, Kwanglim, (2018)
-
Myopic risk-taking in tournaments
Eriksen, Kristoffer W., (2014)
- More ...
-
Mammen, Jan, (2021)
-
Corporate diversification, sell-offs, and firm risk
Mammen, Jan, (2013)
-
Silver bullet or ricochet? : CEOs’ use of metaphorical communication and infomediaries’ evaluations
König, Andreas, (2018)
- More ...