Managerial style in cost asymmetry and shareholder value

We show that CEOs' contribution to SG&A cost asymmetry is associated with lower shareholder value. CEO-related excess SG&A cost stickiness of CEOs with compensation less tied to shareholder value creation and high power drive this association. Last, we provide first evidence that cost asymmetry incorporates a harmful element to the firm and shareholders, namely CEO-related excess SG&A cost asymmetry.

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Lopatta, Kerstin ; Kaspereit, Thomas ; Gastone, Laura‐Maria
Published in:	Managerial and Decision Economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 1099-1468. - Vol. 41.2020, 5, p. 800-826
Publisher:	Hoboken, NJ : Wiley

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1002/mde.3139 [DOI] hdl:10419/230201 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428810