Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control
If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a "shark repellent" through long-term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as "white squires" for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers. Copyright 2005 by The American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | PAGANO, M. ; VOLPIN, P. F. |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 60.2005, 2, p. 841-868
|
Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Managers, workers, and corporate control
Pagano, Marco, (2005)
-
Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device.
Padilla, A.J., (1996)
-
Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control
Pagano, M., (2005)
- More ...