• 1. Introduction
  • 2. The existence of a conflict situation
  • 2.1 Conflicting parties
  • 2.2 Interdependence
  • 2.3 Conflict of interest
  • 2.4 Information asymmetry
  • 3. Stucturing the conflict situation
  • 3.1 Vulnerability
  • 3.1.1 Key employee turnover
  • 3.1.2 Product observability
  • 3.1.3 System dependence
  • 3.1.4 Parallel development
  • 3.1.5 Absorptive capacity
  • 3.2 Competitive advantage
  • 4. Types of conflict situations
  • 4.1 Type Alert: high vulnerability and competitive advantage
  • 4.2 Type Ambiguity: lov vulnerablility and competitive advantage
  • 4.3 Type Slack: low vulnerability and absence of competitive advantage
  • 5. Designing the conflict situation
  • 5.1 Before technology transfer: the information game
  • 5.1.1 Headquarters remains ignoran
  • 5.1.2 Headquarters elicits information by using threats
  • 5.1.3 Headquarters' screening mechanism to elicit information
  • 5.1.4 Subsidiary signals trustworthiness
  • 5.2 Cooperation in repeated technology transfer games
  • 5.2.1 Creating trust
  • 5.2.2 Sustaining trust
  • 5.2.3 Subsidiary's self-commitment to trust
  • 6. Implications
  • 6.1 Research implications
  • 6.2 Managerial implications
  • 7. Conclusion