- 1. Introduction
- 2. The existence of a conflict situation
- 2.1 Conflicting parties
- 2.2 Interdependence
- 2.3 Conflict of interest
- 2.4 Information asymmetry
- 3. Stucturing the conflict situation
- 3.1 Vulnerability
- 3.1.1 Key employee turnover
- 3.1.2 Product observability
- 3.1.3 System dependence
- 3.1.4 Parallel development
- 3.1.5 Absorptive capacity
- 3.2 Competitive advantage
- 4. Types of conflict situations
- 4.1 Type Alert: high vulnerability and competitive advantage
- 4.2 Type Ambiguity: lov vulnerablility and competitive advantage
- 4.3 Type Slack: low vulnerability and absence of competitive advantage
- 5. Designing the conflict situation
- 5.1 Before technology transfer: the information game
- 5.1.1 Headquarters remains ignoran
- 5.1.2 Headquarters elicits information by using threats
- 5.1.3 Headquarters' screening mechanism to elicit information
- 5.1.4 Subsidiary signals trustworthiness
- 5.2 Cooperation in repeated technology transfer games
- 5.2.1 Creating trust
- 5.2.2 Sustaining trust
- 5.2.3 Subsidiary's self-commitment to trust
- 6. Implications
- 6.1 Research implications
- 6.2 Managerial implications
- 7. Conclusion
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