Managing genetic tests, surveillance, and preventive medicine under a public health insurance system
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Filipova-Neumann, Lilia ; Hoy, Michael |
Published in: |
Journal of health economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6296, ZDB-ID 625797-5. - Vol. 34.2014, p. 31-41
|
Subject: | Genetic tests | Medical surveillance | Public health insurance | Moral Hazard | Value of Information | Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung | Gentechnik | Genetic engineering | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Informationswert | Information value | Gesundheitsvorsorge | Preventive care | Krankenversicherung | Health insurance | Gesundheitswesen | Health care system | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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