Managing Posterior Price Matching : The Role of Customer Boundedly Rational Expectations

The posterior price matching policy, whereby a firm promises to reimburse the price difference to a customer who purchases a product before the firm marks it down, has been used in practice. The extensive literature has offered the following explanations why posterior price matching is adopted: to reduce inventory, to soften competition, to price discriminate consumers, and to eliminate consumer strategic waiting incentives. In this paper, we provide a novel explanation and investigate the role of consumer bounded rationality in the sense of anecdotal reasoning. We adopt a simple model that allows us to isolate the role of customer bounded rationality on using posterior price matching. We demonstrate that while it is never optimal to adopt posterior price matching when consumers have rational expectations, it can be optimal when they have boundedly rational expectations. We show when and how a seller can intentionally mark down with some probability and adopt price matching to make a profit. Ignoring customer bounded rationality can result in a significant profit loss. Then, we build a dynamic programming model to investigate how the firm should dynamically manage its markdowns over the long run. We show that a cyclic policy switching between a high and low markdown probability is typically optimal for exploiting customer bounded rationality. We characterize the nature of the cyclic policy and the range in which it is optimal. Our findings underscore the importance of consumer bounded rationality and provide managerial and practical guidelines on how to manage price matching when customers are boundedly rational