Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

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Year of publication:	2010-06-14
Authors:	Ashlagi, Itai ; Klijn, Flip
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	matching \| deferred acceptance \| manipulability \| welfare

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	1 pages long
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574232