Manipulability in Matching Markets : Conflict and Coincidence of Interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ashlagi, Itai
Other Persons:	Klijn, Flip (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Matching \| Manipulation \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Marktmechanismus \| Market mechanism \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Offenbarte Präferenzen \| Revealed preferences

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Series:	Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper ; No. 10-111
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 14, 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1624901 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142219