Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly beneﬁt and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

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Year of publication:	2010-06
Authors:	Ashlagi, Itai ; Klijn, Flip
Institutions:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 479
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547283