Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts
Michael Kuhn; Luigi Siciliani
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kuhn, Michael ; Siciliani, Luigi |
| Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 32.2013, p. 251-267
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| Subject: | Auditing | Commitment | Fraud | Moral hazard | Public-sector contracting | Moral Hazard | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Öffentlicher Sektor | Public sector | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Betrug | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230687