Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
Michele Gori
| Year of publication: |
2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Gori, Michele |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 129.2021, p. 350-369
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| Subject: | Strategy-proofness | Social choice function | Anonymity | Group strategy-proofness | Manipulability | Pareto optimality | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Manipulation | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem |
| Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Erratum enthalten in: Volume 135, September 2022, Seite 434-435 |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.007 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819886