Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs

In this paper we define manipulation with restricted beliefs as the possibility for some voter to have an insincere preference ordering that dominates the sincere one within the given individual beliefs over other agents' preferences. We then show that all non-dictatorial voting schemes are manipulable in this sense, up to a given threshold.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel ; Mbih, Boniface ; Moyouwou, Issofa
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 44.2008, 11, p. 1232-1242
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Strategy-proofness Voting schemes Restricted beliefs

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005388198