Manipulations in Contests

We study the classical Tullock's model of one-stage contests where the probability of winning is a function of the efforts exerted by the contestants. We show that by a simple non-discriminating rule the contest designer is able to manipulate the outcome of the contest such that the probabilities to win are not ordered according to the contestants' abilities.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004-04
Authors:	Cohen, Chen ; Sela, Aner
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	contests \| Tullock's models

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 4344
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; L83 - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792334