Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences

We consider the many-to-many two-sided matching problem under a stringent domain restriction on preferences called the max-min criterion. We show that, even under this restriction, there is no stable mechanism that is weakly Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, or monotonic (i.e. respects improvements) for agents on one side of the market. These results imply in particular that three of the main results of Baiou and Balinski (2000) are incorrect

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Hatfield, John William
Other Persons:	Kojima, Fuhito (contributor) ; Narita, Yusuke (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Matching \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Suchtheorie \| Search theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 17, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1986748 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112265