Marginal Deterrence, Escalating Penalties and Enforcement Inconsistency

The Law and Economics literature on public law enforcement has generally treated separately the issue of marginal deterrence from that of punishing repeated offenders though escalating penalties. We extend the model provided by Emons (2003) to show how pursuing both policies may generate an inconsistent enforcement design.

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Year of publication:	2009-08
Authors:	Basili, Marcello ; Nicita, Antonio
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Politica Economica, Finanza e Sviluppo (DEPFID), Facoltà di Economia "Richard M. Goodwin"
Subject:	Marginal Deterrence \| Recidivism \| Escalating Penalties \| Incapacitation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015522