Marginal Deterrence When Offenders Act Sequentially

Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for oenders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the act, even when enforcement is specific.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014-05
Authors:	Friehe, Tim ; Miceli, Thomas
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Connecticut

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The price is Free Number 2014-09 9 pages
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888389