Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially

Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for offenders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the act, even when enforcement is specific.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Friehe, Tim ; Miceli, Thomas J.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 124.2014, 3, p. 523-525
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Crime \| Deterrence \| Marginal deterrence \| Optimal sanctions

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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