Market Segmentation, Market Integration and Tacit Collusion

This paper shows that moving from market segmentation to market integration (i.e. firms can no longer discriminate among markets) has anti-competitive effects in a repeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is the enforcement strategy. In particular, we show that two countries can never both experience pro-competitive gains and that two similar countries always both experience anti-competitive effects from market integration.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Colonescu, C. ; Schmitt, N.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
Subject:	INTERNATIONAL TRADE \| TRADE POLICY \| COMPETITION \| TRADE LIBERALIZATION

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages
Classification:	F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies ; F15 - Economic Integration ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005035570